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  This  article  studies  the  manufacturer's  pricing  strategy  in  a  supply  chain  with  a  single 
manufacturer and two competing retailers. The manufacturer, as a Stackelberg leader specifies 
wholesale  prices  to  two  retailers  who  face  advertisement  dependent  demand.  Based  on  this 
gaming structure, two mathematical models are developed - the cooperative advertising model 
where  manufacturer  shares  a  fraction  of  retailers'  advertising  costs  and  the  non-cooperative 
advertising model where manufacturer does not share any retailer's advertising expenses. The 
optimal strategies of the manufacturer and retailers are determined and a numerical example is 
taken to illustrate the theoretical results derived. We show that cooperative advertising policy is 
beneficial not only for the participating entities but also for the entire supply chain. 
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1. Introduction  
 
 
The study of consumer behaviour explores that besides price, there are other factors such as product 
quality, brand image and service which have significant influence on consumers' purchasing decisions 
and  hence  market  demand.  Advertising  is  a  very  common  communication  tool  used  by  business 
organisations to notify consumers about their products and services. To inform consumers regarding a 
commercial offering, a firm has to invest money for advertisement via various traditional mass media 
such as newspaper, magazines, television channels, radio as well as outdoor advertisement such as 
distribution of leaflets among people or displaying messages in sign boards or banners, etc. Some new 
media  such  as  direct  mail,  social  networking  sites,  text  messages  are  also  used  in  promotional 
campaign.  With  the  objective  of  persuading  consumers  to  buy,  advertising  performs  two  major 
functions. Firstly, it provides valuable information to consumers regarding product and enable them to 
make  rationale  choices  by  reducing  informational  product  differentiation.  Secondly,  it  persuades 
consumers by  means  of  intangible  and/or psychic differentiators  and  creates differentiation  among   
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products (Huang et al., 2012). Since advertising significantly impacts consumers' purchasing behavior 
and thus demand, firms now-a-days are increasing their advertising expenditures to boost sales and 
maximize profit. 
Cooperative  (or  co-op)  advertising  is  an  interactive  scheme  or  financial  agreement  between  a 
manufacturer and a retailer in which the retailer initiates and implements a local advertisement and the 
manufacturer pays part of the cost. It is often used in consumer goods industry and it plays an important 
role in marketing strategy of many companies. The percentage of retailer's advertising cost which the 
manufacturer agrees to pay is commonly referred to as manufacturer's ‘participation rate’ (Bergen & 
John, 1997). Though both manufacturers and retailer make advertising efforts to increase sales at the 
retail level, their outlooks are different. The manufacturer's national advertising is intended to influence 
potential customers to consider brand and increase brand image and awareness, while retailer's local 
advertising  is intended to bring potential customers to the stage of desire and action, and give an 
immediate reason to buy (Huang & Li, 2001). Manufacturer uses co-op advertising to strengthen the 
image of the brand and motivate immediate sales at the retail level (Hutchins, 1953). In the absence of 
co-op advertising, a retailer may advertise for the manufacturer's product to increase its sales, but it 
might  not  do  to  that  extent  which  the  manufacturer  prefers.  Therefore,  manufacturer  sometimes 
provides financial assistance to the retailer to increase its advertising efforts. According to Brennan 
(1988), in the personal computer industry, IBM offers a 50-50 split of advertising costs with retailers 
while  Apple  pays  75%  of  the  media  cost.  Nagler  (2006)  reports that  total  expenditures  on  co-op 
advertising in the United States in 2000 were estimated at  15 $  billion; an approximately four-fold 
increase in real terms compared with  900 $ million in 1970. The overall significance and growing trend 
in co-op advertising suggest the need for more research on this topic.   
 
The research on co-op advertising can be broadly categorized under two groups. In the first group, 
researchers solely concentrate their analyses on advertising. Berger (1972) was the first to study co-op 
advertising between a manufacturer and a retailer quantitatively. Dant and Berger (1996) used co-op 
advertising in the context of franchising. Roslow et al. (1993) studied co-op advertising in a supply 
chain and showed that sharing of advertising investment leads to improved profit of the whole supply 
chain.  More  studies  on  co-op  advertising  can  be  found  in  the  articles  contributed by  Karray  and 
Zaccour (2006), Jorgensen et al. (2000, 2003) and Jorgensen and Zaccour (2003). Motivated by the rise 
of retailing power from manufacturer to retailer in recent years, Huang and Li (2001) used game-theory 
to study co-op advertising models in the context of different relationships between the manufacturer 
and the retailer. They relaxed the leader-follower relationship between a manufacturer and a retailer 
and considered the simultaneous move game. The equilibrium attained in the process is termed as Nash 
equilibrium. They showed that if the profit ratio of the manufacturer and the retailer is relatively low 
then the local advertising expenditure is lower at Nash equilibrium than at Stackelberg equilibrium; 
otherwise, it is higher at Nash equilibrium than at Stackelberg equilibrium. Similar approaches but with 
slightly different demand functions were considered by Li et al. (2002), Huang et al. (2002) and Huang 
and Li (2005). 
 
The other group of researchers, e.g., Bergen and John (1997), Kim and Staelin (1997), and Karray and 
Zaccour  (2007)  considered  price  as  decision  variable.  Yue  et  al.  (2006)  considered  cooperative 
advertising in a two-level manufacturer-retailer supply chain where demand is price- sensitive. They 
determined  optimal  decisions  of  the  manufacturer  and  the  retailer  in  both  cooperative  and  non-
cooperative  cases when manufacturer provides a price discount directly to the  customers. Xie and 
Neyret (2009) discussed co-op advertising and pricing strategies in a manufacturer-retailer channel. 
They considered four different models which are based on three non-cooperative games (i.e. Nash, 
retailer-Stackelberg and manufacturer-Stackelberg) and one cooperative  game. Xie and Wei (2009) 
identified  the  optimal  equilibrium pricing  and  co-op  advertising  strategies  in  channel  coordination 
between a manufacturer and a retailer. More articles that deal with pricing and advertising decisions 
can be found in Szmerekovsky and Zhang (2009), Yan (2010), SeyedEsfahani et al. (2011) and others. B. C. Giri and S. Sharma  / International Journal of Industrial Engineering Computations 5 (2014) 
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Recently,  Kunter  (2012)  analyzed  a  royalty  payment  contract  for  coordination  of  a  manufacturer-
retailer  channel  where  consumer  demand  is  simultaneously  affected  by  retail  price  and  by 
manufacturer's and retailer's marketing efforts. For a more comprehensive review of the literature on 
co-op advertising in supply chain, readers can be referred to the article contributed by Aust and Busher 
(2014). 
 
This paper investigates the effects of manufacturer's different pricing strategies in a supply chain with 
one manufacturer and two competing retailers. The manufacturer as a Stackelberg  leader specifies 
wholesale prices to retailers who face advertising dependent demand. Depending upon the prevailing 
market situations and retailers' sales cost information, the manufacturer may chose different pricing 
strategy. Chen et al. (2012) examined manufacturer's pricing strategies in a two-level supply chain with 
one  manufacturer  and  two  competing  retailers  who  face  warranty  period-dependent  demand.  The 
literature on co-op advertising in supply chain dealing with retail competition is sparse, with some 
exceptions such as He et al. (2011) and Wang et al. (2011). Mirzaee et al. (2012) discussed supply 
chain coordination in a two-level supply chain with one manufacturer and two competing retailers 
under advertising dependent demand. These articles did not consider the  impact of pricing on the 
manufacturer’s and retailers’ as well as whole supply chain's performances. The present study focuses 
on the evaluation of manufacturer's pricing strategy in conjunction with retailers' gaming interactions 
and its likely impact on supply chain's performance. The results of this study provide guidelines to both 
the manufacturer and retailers who face similar challenges. 
 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: Assumptions and model description are presented 
in  Section  2.  In  Section  3,  cooperative  advertising  model  is  formulated  under  different  pricing 
strategies proposed by the manufacturer. Section 4 studies the impact of the manufacturer's different 
pricing  strategies  on  the  members’  as  well  as  the  entire  supply  chain's  performances.  Section  5 
discusses  the  non-cooperative  model  where  manufacturer  does  not  participate  in  cooperative 
advertising. Using a numerical example, theoretical results are verified in Section 6. In Section 7, we 
summarize the main findings of our research and indicate several possible extensions and follow-up 
issues. 
 
2.  Assumptions and model description 
We  consider  a  two-echelon  supply  chain  where  one  manufacturer  sells  its  product  through  two 
competing retailers. The manufacturer is the Stackelberg leader and the retailers are the followers. Let 
the unit retail price be p and the unit manufacturing cost be c. The two retailers have different sales 
efficiencies and hence have different sales cost. Let the retailer  i’s unit sales cost be   		(  = 1,2). 
Without  any  loss  of  generality,  we  assume  that     <   .  We  assume  that  the  market  demand  is 
influenced by the advertising expenditure incurred by the retailers in promoting the product. Further, 
the price differentiation between retailers is insignificant to the customers at the time of purchasing. 
The two retailers compete with each other in advertising. To each retailer, the demand increases with 
its own advertising while it decreases with the advertising done by his/her opponent. Similar to other 
conventional demand function (defined by Arcelus et al. 2012, Wu et al. 2012), we define retailer i’s  
demand  by   (  ) =   +      −  √  ,  (i=1,2  and  j=3-i).  Here,      denotes  retailer  i’s  advertising 
expenditure,  α  denotes  the  primary  demand  of  retailer  i,  β  represents  consumers’  sensitivity  to 
advertising done by retailer i, while   denotes competitive factor. The linear and symmetrical demand 
function represents a situation in which two retailers have equal competing power in a duopolistic 
market place. We assume   <  , which ensures that the response functions are negatively sloped and 
the  Nash  equilibrium  exists.  This  appears  reasonable  since  sales  are  relatively  more  sensitive  to 
retailer's own advertising than the advertising done by the competing retailer. This demand pattern has 
often been used in marketing research (see Ingene and Parry 1995; Padmanabhan and Png, 1997) and in 
some economics literature (see Singh and Vives 1984; Vives, 1984, 1985).    
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3. Model I: Cooperative advertising model 
We assume that the manufacturer shares a fraction ( ) of each retailer's advertising allowances. The 
manufacturer  sets  the  same  proportion  of  advertising  allowance  to  two  competing  retailers.  The 
Robinson-Patman  Act  (1936)  requires  a  manufacturer  to  treat  all  competitive  retailers  equally 
(proportionately)  with  respect  to  advertising  allowances  (Wang  et  al.,  2011).  We  assume  that  the 
manufacturer considers three pricing options in deciding wholesale prices for the retailers: (1) the same 
wholesale price for each retailer, while disregarding their differences with regard to sales cost (strategy 
1); (2) different wholesale prices to each retailer on the basis of their sales costs (strategy 2); and (3) the 
same wholesale price to each retailer according to the average sales cost of the industry (strategy 3).  
3.1. Case1: Manufacturer's pricing strategy 1 
 
With manufacturer's pricing strategy 1, the sequence of events is as follows: the manufacturer first sets 
a common wholesale price   according to retailer's sales cost  's,  . In response, the retailers 
observe  and follow Nash equilibrium to determine their optimal advertising expenditures.  
 
3.1.1. The retailer's problem 
The retailer   faces the problem of determining advertising expenditure   which maximizes his/her 
profit. Retailer   profit is given by  
 
		    
  = (  −    −   )   +       −        − (1 −  )   ,   = 1,2  and  j=3-i.  (1) 
                                                                                            
Proposition 1. For the pricing strategy 1 of the manufacturer, the retailers 1 and 2's optimal 
advertising expenditures are given by  
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Proposition  1  indicates  that  the  retailers'  optimal  advertising  expenditures  increase  as  the 
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Proposition 2. For pricing strategy 1 of the manufacturer, retailer 1 gains more profit than retailer 2. 
 
Proof: From Eq. (2) and Eq. (3), we obtain 
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for the manufacturer’s pricing strategy 1, retailer 1 gains higher profit than retailer 2. This completes 
the proof. 
   
3.1.2. The manufacturer's problem  
 
The manufacturer faces the issue of determining the wholesale price which maximizes his/her profit. 
The manufacturer’s profit is given by 
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(5) 
The manufacturer's optimal wholesale price can be obtained as given in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 3. For the pricing strategy 1, the manufacturer's optimal wholesale price is given by  
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This completes the proof.  
 
From Eq. (1) and Eq. (4) and from Propositions 1 and 3, we obtain the profit of the entire supply chain 
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3.2. Case 2: Manufacturer's pricing strategy 2  
 
With manufacturer's pricing strategy 2, the sequence of events is as follows: the manufacturer first sets 
different wholesale prices  21 w  and  22 w  to retailers 1 and 2, respectively, according to their different 
sales  costs  1 s   and  2 s .  Then  the  retailers  observe  i w2 ,  1,2 = i   and  follow  Nash's  equilibrium  to 
determine their optimal advertising expenditures. 
   
3.2.1. The retailer's problem 
 
The  retailer’s  problem  is  to  determine  the  advertising  expense  that  maximizes  his/her  profit.  The 
retailer's profit is given by 
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Proposition 4. For the pricing strategy 2 of the manufacturer, the retailers 1 and 2’s optimal 
advertising expenditures are  
                               .   ,
) 4(1
) (
=        
) 4(1
) (
=
2
2 2
2 22 *
22 2
2 2
1 21 *
21 ly respective
t
s w p
I and
t
s w p
I

 

   
 
Proof: The proof is omitted as it is similar to that given in Proposition 1. 
 
Substituting the values of   and   in Eq. (9), the retailer 1’s optimal profit can be derived as 
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 3.2.2. The manufacturer's problem 
 
The manufacturer's problem is to select different wholesale prices   which maximize his/her 
profit. The manufacturer's profit is given by 
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Substituting the values of   and   from Proposition 4, we obtain 
 
2 2
21 1 22 2 22 2 21 1
2 21 22 21 22
2
2 2
21 1 22 2 2
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( , ) ( ) ( )
2(1 ) 2(1 ) 2(1 ) 2(1 )
( ) ( )
4(1 )
m p w s p w s p w s p w s
TP w w w c w c
t t t t
t
p w s p w s
t
   
 

           
           
           
          
 
 
 
 
(13) 
With regard to the manufacturer’s optimal wholesale prices, we state the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 5. For the pricing strategy 2, the manufacturer's optimal wholesale prices are  
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Proof: The proof is given in Appendix. 
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*
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the proof.   
 
From the above corollary, we find that the manufacturer charges a greater wholesale price to retailer 1 
than retailer 2. Also, we find that retailer 1 incurs a greater advertising expenditure than retailer 2. 
Thus, from Proposition 1 and Corollary 1, we conclude that retailer 1 spends more than retailer 2 in 
advertising with both manufacturer's pricing strategies 1 and 2. 
 
Proposition 6. For the pricing strategy 2 of the manufacturer, retailer 1 gains higher profit than 
retailer 2. 
 
Proof: From Eqs.  (10) and (11), we have  
   
    
  (   
∗ ) −     
  (   
∗ ) =  [(  −    
∗ −   ) − (  −    
∗ −   )]+ 
  
4(1 −  )
[(  −    
∗ −   )  − (  −    
∗ −   ) ] 
                   

      ) ((
) 4(1
))[ ( ) (( = 1
*
21
2
2
*
22 1
*
21 s w p
t
s w p s w p

  
                    ))] ( 2
*
22 s w p      
             
482
 
             
))] ( ) ((
) 4(1
)[ ( = 2
*
22 1
*
21
2
1 2
*
21
*
22 s w p s w p
t
s s w w     

   

  
From Corollary 1, we have  0 >
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From Propositions 2 and 6, we find that retailer 1 obtains more profit than retailer 2 under both the 
pricing strategies 1 and 2. From Eq. (9) and Eq. (12), and from Propositions 4 and 5, the profit of the 
entire supply chain with manufacturer’s pricing strategy 2 is given by 
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(16) 
       
3.3. Case 3: Manufacturer’s pricing strategy 3  
 
With manufacturer’s pricing strategy 3, the sequence of events is as follows: the manufacturer sets the 
wholesale price   according to retailers’ average sales cost  ; then the retailers observe   
and determine their optimal advertising expenditures according to their actual sales costs  , in 
accordance with Nash's equilibrium. 
 
3.3.1. The retailer’s problem 
 
With the average sales cost  )/2 ( 2 1 s s  , the retailer i aims to determine his/her advertising expense that 
can maximize profit. Retailer  s i  profit is given by  
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From Eq. (17), we have  
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3
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i
i
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I dTP
, we get retailer’s optimal advertising 
expenditure as  
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(18) 
 
3.3.2. The manufacturer's problem  
 
The  manufacturer  aims  to  determine  the  wholesale  price  which  maximizes  his/her  profit.  The 
manufacturer’s profit is given by  
2
0 0 0 0
3 3 3 3 3 31 32
=1
( ) = [( )( )] ( ),   = 3 .
m
i j
i
TP w w c I I t I I j i            
(19) 
Substituting the values of 
0
31 I  and 
0
32 I  from Eq. (18), the manufacturer's profit can be written as  
3 w )/2 ( 2 1 s s  3 w
1,2 =   ,i siB. C. Giri and S. Sharma  / International Journal of Industrial Engineering Computations 5 (2014) 
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Next,  with  regard  to  manufacturer’s  optimal  wholesale  price,  we  present  below  the  following 
proposition: 
 
Proposition 7. For the pricing strategy 3, the manufacturer's optimal wholesale price is given by  
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 Proof: From Eq. (20), we have 
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(22) 
Therefore,  ) ( 3 3 w TP
m   is  concave  in  3 w .  Solving  0 =
) (
3
3 3
dw
w dTP
m
,  we  obtain  after  simplification, the 
manufacturer’s optimal wholesale price as  
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(23) 
                                                                                
This completes the proof. 
 
From  the  above  proposition,  we  conclude  that  the  manufacturer’s  optimal  wholesale  price  with 
manufacturer’s pricing strategy 3 is equivalent to the case with pricing strategy 1. This means that the 
retailers will have the same decisions as in the case under pricing strategy 1. 
 
Proposition 8.  
 
With manufacturer’s pricing strategy 3, retailer   optimal advertising expenditure is equivalent to the 
case with pricing strategy 1, i.e, 
0
3i I  satisfies  
 
2 2 2 2
0 * 0 * 1 1 1 2
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Hence, we can conclude that profit of the entire supply chain with manufacturer's pricing strategy 3 is 
equal to that with manufacturer’s pricing strategy 1, i.e,  .   
 
4. Discussion 
In this section, we investigate the effects of manufacturer’s different pricing strategies on retailers’ 
optimal advertising expenditures and their optimal profits, manufacturer’s optimal wholesale price and 
his/her optimal profit and also profit of the entire supply chain.  
s i
w w TP TP 1 3 =  
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. This completes the proof. 
 
The above proposition implies that, with pricing strategy 2, manufacturer sets a higher wholesale price 
for retailer 1 and lower wholesale price for retailer 2 compared to those with pricing strategy 1. With 
regard to retailer's optimal advertising expenditure, we now have the following result: 
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completes the proof. 
 
The above proposition implies that, with pricing strategy 2, the manufacturer sets a higher wholesale 
price for retailer 1 and therefore retailer 1 invests less in advertising compared to the case with pricing 
strategy 1. On the other hand, in the case with pricing strategy 2, the manufacturer sets lower wholesale 
price for retailer 2 and thus retailer 2 takes this opportunity to incur a higher advertising expenditure 
than that in the case with pricing strategy 1. 
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Proof: See Appendix. 
 
Proposition 12.  ) ( < ) (
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11 11
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r r  and  ) ( > ) (
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Proof: See Appendix. 
 
From the above proposition, we find that retailer 1 gains a lower profit from manufacturer's pricing 
strategy 2 than pricing strategy 1, and retailer 2 gains a higher profit from pricing strategy 2 than 
pricing strategy 1. Since retailer 1’s profit is negatively effected with manufacturer’s pricing strategy 2, 
retailer 1 would not like the manufacturer to adopt pricing strategy 2. 
 
Proposition 13. The profit of the supply chain is higher for manufacturer's pricing strategy 1 than that 
for pricing strategy 2 i.e., 
w w TP TP 2 1 >  
 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
The above proposition suggests that for manufacturer's pricing strategy 1, the profit of the supply chain 
as a whole is higher than that for pricing strategy 2. B. C. Giri and S. Sharma  / International Journal of Industrial Engineering Computations 5 (2014) 
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From the above results, we have the following conclusions: With pricing strategy 2, the manufacturer 
will gain higher profit and retailer 1 will gain lower profit than the case with pricing strategy 1. The 
manufacturer being the Stackelberg leader, dominates the supply chain, and therefore, if the sales cost 
information is  symmetrical, then the manufacturer would adopt pricing strategy 2. However, since 
retailer  1’s  profit  is  adversely  affected  with  manufacturer’s  pricing  strategy  2,  and  sales  cost 
information is, in general, business propriety information, retailer 1 would not like to share his/her sales 
cost information with the manufacturer. The manufacturer will then decide a wholesale price based on 
the average sales cost (pricing strategy 3). Therefore, retailer 1 will gain the same profit as in the case 
with pricing strategy 1. Thus, pricing strategy 3 appears to be more reasonable and acceptable from 
practical point of view. 
5. Model II: Non-cooperative advertising model 
In  this  model,  we  assume  that  the  manufacturer  does  not  adopt  co-op  advertising  and  hence  the 
manufacturer does not  share retailer’s advertising  expenses.  Thus, the retailers  has  to bear  all the 
advertising expenditures themselves. The model, in particular, becomes a special case of Model I when 
0 = t , and thus all the optimal results in this model can be obtained from Model I by substituting  0 = t . 
The optimal results are presented in Table 1. Since the optimal results under manufacturer's pricing 
strategy 3 are equivalent to those under manufacturer’s pricing strategy 1, we discuss the optimal 
results  under  manufacturer’s pricing  strategies  1  and  2  only.  With  regard  to  relationship  between 
manufacturer’s optimal wholesale prices obtained from two models, we have the following results: 
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This completes the proof. 
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Optimal results when manufacturer does not adopt cooperative advertising 
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Proof:  From Eqs. (24) and (25) , we have 
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This proposition implies that difference between manufacturer’s optimal wholesale prices under pricing 
strategy 2 in the cooperative advertising model is greater than that in the non-cooperative advertising 
model. 
Corollary 4.   
.
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obtain the required result. This completes the proof. 
6. Numerical study  
In this section, we illustrate by a numerical example the theoretical results developed in the previous 
sections. The parameter-values are taken as follows: α = 7, β = 2,   = 0.2,   = $16,   = $5,    =
$2,	   = $3,   = 0.1. 
Model I: Cooperative advertising model  
 
For  the  pricing  strategy  1  of  the  manufacturer,  the  optimal  results  are  obtained  as 
. 97 . 185 $ , 48 . 142 $ , 63 . 15 $ , 86 . 27 $ , 25 . 4 $ , 06 . 10 $ , 14 . 11 $ 1 1 12 11
*
12
*
11
*
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w m r r TP TP TP TP I I w
 
For  the  pricing  strategy  2  of  the  manufacturer,  the  optimal  results  are  obtained  as 
. 81 . 185 $
, 84 . 142 $ , 57 . 18 $ , 40 . 24 $ , 53 . 5 $ , 30 . 8 $ , 88 . 10 $ , 41 . 11 $
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Model II: Non-cooperative advertising model 
 
For  the  pricing  strategy  1  of  the  manufacturer,  the  optimal  results  are  obtained  as 
. 52 . 179 $ , 14 . 138 $ , 88 . 14 $ , 50 . 26 $ , 26 . 3 $ ˆ , 87 . 7 $ ˆ , 19 . 11 $ ˆ 1 1 12 11
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12
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11
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For  the  pricing  strategy  2  of  the  manufacturer,  the  optimal  results  are  obtained  as  follows: 
. 34 . 179 $ , 41 . 138 $
, 56 . 17 $ , 37 . 23 $ , 22 . 4 $ ˆ , 53 . 6 $ ˆ , 94 . 10 $ ˆ , 44 . 11 $ ˆ
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From the numerical results of the two models, we find that retailer 1 gains a higher profit than retailer 2 
under both the pricing strategies set by the manufacturer. Also, retailer 1 incurs a higher advertising 
expenditure than retailer 2 irrespective of the pricing strategies set by the manufacturer. We observe 
that retailer 1’s profit is higher with pricing strategy 1 of the manufacturer than with pricing strategy 2, 
whereas  retailer  2’s  profit  is  higher  with  pricing  strategy  2  than  with  pricing  strategy  1.  The 
manufacturer’s  profit  is  higher  with  pricing  strategy  2  than  with  pricing  strategy  1.  With  pricing 
strategy  1,  profit  of  the  entire  supply  chain  is  higher  than with  pricing  strategy  2.  All  the  above   
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observations are consistent with the theoretical results derived in the two models. We also find that 
cooperative advertising increases the profit not only for the manufacturer and the retailers but also for 
the entire supply chain. Thus, cooperative advertising is beneficial not only to the participating entities 
but also to the entire supply chain.  Next, we examine the effect of competition between retailers and 
impact of few model-parameters on the performance of the whole chain and its members.   
6.1. The effect of competition 
 
The effect of competition on profit is shown in Figs. 1-2. Fig. 1 describes the impact of competition on 
retailers’ profits under manufacturer’s pricing strategies 1 and 2. From Fig. 1, we observe that retailer 
1’s profit is higher than retailer 2’s profit under each of the pricing strategies. At the same time, retailer 
1’s profit under pricing strategy 2 is lower than that under pricing strategy 1 and retailer 2’s profit is 
higher than that under pricing strategy 1. Fig. 2 shows that the manufacturer obtains a higher profit with 
pricing strategy 2 than with pricing strategy 1. The profit of the entire supply chain is higher under 
pricing strategy 1 than under pricing strategy 2. From Figs. 1 and 2, we find that as competition 
between  retailers  increases,  the  profits  of  the  manufacturer,  retailers,  and  the  entire  supply  chain 
decrease. Thus, increase in competition will adversely affect the manufacturer, retailers, and the supply 
chain.  Fig.  3  shows  that  retailers’  optimal  advertising  expenditure  decreases  with  increase  in 
competition. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.  Impact of competition on retailers’  profit  Fig. 2. Impact of competition on manufacturer’sand entire 
supply’s profits  
 
                                         
6.2. Sensitivity analysis 
 
In this sub-section, we perform the sensitivity analysis of key model-parameters of Model I under each 
of the manufacturer’s pricing strategies. From Figs. 4-6, we observe that an increase in unit retail price 
p  results in increase in profits of the manufacturer, retailers and the entire supply chain.  
Also, retailers’ optimal advertising expenditures increase with increase in unit retail price. From Figs. 
7-9, we find that the profits of the retailers, manufacturer and the entire supply chain all decrease with 
increase in manufacturer’s unit production cost c . Also, each retailer’s optimal advertising expenditure 
decreases with increase in the manufacturer’s unit production cost. 
 
The above observations suggests that the retailers increase their advertising expenditure to generate 
more  customer demand  and  hence  order  higher  quantities  of  product,  which  is  beneficial  to  both 
retailers and manufacturer. However, with an increase in unit manufacturing cost  c , the manufacturer B. C. Giri and S. Sharma  / International Journal of Industrial Engineering Computations 5 (2014) 
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will charge higher wholesale price to retailers  which leads to a decrease in unit sale profit of the 
retailers. As a result, the retailers will invest less in advertising and order lesser quantities of product 
from the manufacturer, which will be detrimental to the profit of the manufacturer and the retailers.  
From Figs. 4-9,  we conclude that an increase in unit retail price  p  will benefit the manufacturer and 
an  increase  in  manufacturer’s  unit  production  cost  c,  will  adversely  affect  the  profits  of  the 
manufacturer, retailers and the entire supply chain. Figs. 10-12 indicate that, as the manufacturer's 
participation rate  t of sharing retailers’ advertising cost increases, the profits of the manufacturer, 
retailers and the entire supply chain increase. Also, retailers’ optimal advertising expenditures increase 
when manufacturer increases his/her proportion of sharing retailers’ advertising expenses. 
   
   
 
 
Fig. 3. Impact of competition on retailer’s advertising 
expenditures  
Fig. 4. Unit retail price vs. profit under pricing   
strategy 1 
   
Fig. 5. Unit retail price vs. profit under pricing   
strategy 2 
Fig. 6. Unit retail price vs. retailers’ optimal  
advertising   
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Fig. 7. Unit production cost vs. profit   
under pricing strategy 1 
Fig. 8. Unit production cost vs. under pricing   
strategy 2 
   
Fig. 9. Unit production cost vs. retailer’s optimal   
advertising expenditures 
Fig. 10. Participation rate vs. profit under   
pricing strategy 1 
   
Fig. 11. Participation rate vs. profit under   
pricing strategy 2 
Fig. 12. Participation rate vs. retailers’ optimal   
advertising expenditures 
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7. Conclusions 
In this paper, we have examined the effect of manufacturer’s pricing strategies in a two-echelon supply 
chain comprising of one manufacturer and two competing retailers whose demands are sensitive to 
advertising investments made by them. We have developed models based on the assumption that the 
manufacturer does/does not undertake cooperative advertising and does/does not share a fraction of 
each  retailer's  advertising  expenditure.  To  set  wholesale  price  to  retailers,  the                         
manufacturer  as  Stackelberg  leader  uses  any  one  of  the  following  three  pricing  strategies:  (1) 
negotiating with retailers simultaneously and setting a wholesale price that applies to both of them; (2) 
negotiating with retailers separately according to their sales cost and setting different wholesale prices 
to the two retailers; (3) negotiating with retailers simultaneously and setting a common wholesale price 
for  both  retailers  according  to  the  average  sales  cost.  We  derive  retailers’  optimal  advertising 
expenditures, their profits, manufacturer’s optimal wholesale price and his/her profit and also profit of 
the entire supply chain. We determine which pricing strategy is beneficial to retailers, the manufacturer 
and the whole supply chain. We also observe that cooperative advertising is beneficial not only to the 
whole supply chain but also to its members. The proposed model can be extended in many ways. One 
immediate extension is the consideration of stochastic demand instead of deterministic demand. One 
may  consider retailers competing in both price  and advertising. The proposed model is developed 
assuming  that  one  manufacturer  sells  through  two  competing  retailers.  It  would  be  interesting  to 
determine the operational strategies when more than one manufacturer also compete in addition to two 
competing retailers. 
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Appendix 
 
Proof of Proposition 5. From Eq. (13), we have 
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Proof of Proposition 11.  
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Proof of Proposition 12.  
 
From Eqs. (1) and (9), we have  
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Proof of Proposition 13.  
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